Source: K. Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (London, 1973), pp.51-90.
C. The Munich Agreement and the "Encirclement" of the Soviet Union
After the Austrian Anschluss , Hitler was tempted to a further step on the path to hegemony. On this occasion, as so often in the history of Europe since the French Revolution, it was a minority group 46 - in this case the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia - which served as the political "explosive" providing the confusion necessary to set off an international crisis.
Our purpose is not to present a history of the Sudeten Germans 47 . Only a little need be said by way of background to the events. The Republic of Czechoslovakia was industrialised and therefore economically viable, but as an artificially created political structure it was exposed to continuous danger from the political undertow created by the renewed strength of the German Reich. The Sudeten Germans living in Czechoslovakia were not treated all that well and their sense of dissatisfaction was certainly justified. Hitler took advantage of the situation of the Sudeten German minority for his own ends. By the beginning of the 1930s the leaders of the Sudeten German Party were already in contact with Nazi Party figures in Berlin centred around Hess 48 . But significantly enough, these contacts only acquired an importance when Hitler's traditionally orientated foreign policy had reached its limits. At that stage, with the help of the dissatisfaction of the "national" minority in Czechoslovakia and in the shadow of British neutrality, it now seemed worthwhile to Hitler to extend beyond these limits in pursuance of his policy of phased conquest. So on 28 March 1938, a few days after the successful Austrian coup, the Fuehrer advises the leaders of the Sudeten German Party to present more exacting demands than the government could possibly satisfy 49 . Those leaders round Konrad Henlein followed these instructions and a month later, in the "Karlsbad Program", the demanded autonomy and the freedom to propagate the German Weltanschauung in Czechoslovakia. However, this meant demanding that the Czech government should humbly tolerate Nazi agitation. The Czech state - which in Berlin had been harangued as the "aircraft carrier" of the Soviet Union - was sliding into the utmost danger. Europe stood on the brink of its next crisis - willed by the German Reich.
Once again Hitler's Program and Chamberlain's appeasement concept came into conflict. On the one hand Hitler planned the phased establishment of a position of world domination based on European hegemony and overseas territories. On the other, Chamberlain's concept was to preserve the British Empire by pursuing a policy of negotiation. So once more the two contestants in the duel appear in the arena. Their conceptions and policies during the Czech crisis are worth analysing. In contrast to the conventional portrayals in diplomatic history, we shall not describe in full the diplomatic situation in Europe with respect to the Czech events. The road to Munich has been surveyed often enough. We know that France felt duty-bound to help Czechoslovakia while Britain was in a sense bound by French conduct and thus always at pains to have a calming effect on Paris, and that Downing Street stubbornly pursued the idea of securing peace by being prepared to make concessions, promising themselves security in return. However, too little attention has been paid to the conceptions and ideas of the statesmen and their nations which lay behind these diplomatic moves, though these conceptions were decisively influential and binding on Chamberlain's Britain, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia at this phase in history. Particularly in connection with the Sudetenland crisis and the network of alliances at that time, it is of great interest to recall that since 1935 Soviet Russia had had a binding pact with the Czechs, and that military assistance from Russia would have presupposed the right to march through Poland. One could fill books with endless reflections on how the Reich could have been forced into withdrawal by employing the Soviet factor as a means of threatening Hitler's policy without actually having to think about the Red Army marching through Poland. Would Hitler's Secret Service not have known all about these possibilities under consideration and so have undermined the effect of the intended threats even at the discussion stage? Since the files of the Secret Service - in the nature of things - are hardly available, and historians cling as always to the maxim quod non est in actis, non est in mundo , such prior considerations are all too often forgotten. The fascination of the diplomatic game tends to impair recognition of and obscure the actual driving forces behind the policies - seen in terms of social history and the history of ideas - and the conceptions of the statesmen evolving them.
But the course, which Neville Chamberlain intended taking in the new crisis troubling Europe became evident on 10 May 1938. It was then that Kirkpatrick, the First Secretary in the British Embassy in Berlin, told the envoy von Bismarck 50 that Britain would be completely willing to come to an agreement on the Sudetenland question on Germany's terms if it could be accomplished peacefully and reasonably. Indeed, in such an event Britain would even be prepared to exert a certain pressure on the Prague government. As the British politicians round Chamberlain - so contemptuously called "the appeasers" - saw it, this additional European concession would be followed by talks between the two nations. For Hitler, on the other hand, this was simply the next stage in his basic plan. By 1943-45 at the latest, he intended striking the "great blow" against the Soviet Union in the East with the aim of attaining European supremacy. Then, after 1945, the next move would be to strike out abroad, across the oceans, into overseas territories.
The parallel between the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian crisis is unmistakable. Both the British and German leaders, Chamberlain and Hitler, held unswervingly to their political conceptions. Russia too, the third decisive party in the issue, but one which was not reckoned among the "inner circle" of powers in European politics, stubbornly pursued a course entirely consistent with Stalin's blueprint for foreign policy. Stalinist Russia, socially so different from the other nations of Europe, and a country which particularly since the purges in the Red Army in 1937 51 was always underestimated in its military strength, had followed this course since 1927 and continued to do so, as will be shown in connection with the events surrounding 23 August 1939. During the "Litvinov era" Russia pursued a policy of co-operation with the anti-revisionist capitalist powers of Britain and France and a strategy of safeguarding the status quo in Central Europe. But under Litvinov's successor, Stalin's hidden aim of maintaining and possibly expanding Russia as a Great Power was to be achieved by other means 52 .
Meanwhile in the Reich the propaganda machine was working flat out against neighbouring Czechoslovakia. In order not to throw a questioning light on the priority placed on the Reich's continental aims in Central Europe, colonial propaganda was now damped down. All possible alternatives to the objectives envisaged by Hitler had to disappear temporarily from view of world opinion and the politicians in London, Paris, and Rome. On 28 May 1938 53 in a talk with his top officers and officials, the Fuehrer declared his unalterable will to smash Czechoslovakia militarily. Two days later, this intention was formulated into a directive from the Fuehrer. On the one hand, it seemed to the army officers that this bound them to obedience to Hitler, yet on the other it also gave rise to the military opposition which was now forming against the Dictator 54 . Hitler elaborated upon the plan of his future policy, remaining in so doing completely within the framework of the Program he had conceived in the 1920s and revised in 1937. He explained that he would first tackle "the task" in the East and then, in three or four years, take the offensive in the West. In 1934, in line with Mein Kampf , he had considered the conquest of France to be the precondition for eastward expansion. In spite of these changing reflections, which were not then elaborated upon, it nevertheless seems to us that the shape of Hitler's ideas had not basically altered. Clearly now, in 1938, he planned to settle the question "on the German frontier" to his own satisfaction. Whether he then intended to move against France or whether, in the shadow of British neutrality, he considered instead marching against the Soviet Union - either with Poland or after conquering it - are two possibilities which must remain unresolved 54a .
The direction of Hitler's strategy was clear. British neutrality, the precondition for any expansionist plans on the Continent, seemed secured. The actual order of the separate lightning campaigns in the East and the West of Europe would be determined largely by the prevailing political and military situation. A major reason for Hitler's counting on Britain's neutrality, however, was that, having built up the army and air force again, the Reich had now begun to re-arm its navy. Germany's admirals, in calculating their strategies, were already having to draw Britain in as a potential, indeed probable, enemy 55 . And according to Hitler, it could quite easily be the case that in the latter half of the 1940s - after attaining supremacy over the Continent and Eastern Europe - the Reich would be confronted by Great Britain as its next natural enemy. This would come about if Britain were to oppose Germany's overseas colonial policy and resist striking against the USA as Germany's junior partner. In 1937 America was already raising her voice in warning against the threatening aggression of both Japan and the Reich 56 . In effect, this gave encouragement to a weakened Britain, though this hardly suited Neville Chamberlain's idea of a policy of settlement; for it gave a boost to those forces of resistance in Britain which, with Churchill at their head, were to hold out in the critical situation of 1940.
In actual fact, in the spring of 1938 the German navy for the first time carried out manoeuvres, which presupposed conflict with Britain. It seemed that the building of an Atlantic fleet was impending 57 and with it the attainment of Hitler's long-term aims for the second half of the 1940s moved into the realm of the possible. For the time being the fleet appeared as a means of exerting pressure on Great Britain should she try to oppose future lightning attacks by the Reich on its path to supremacy.
The foreign policy of the Fuehrer diverged more and more from the ideas of his mostly conservative or "governmental-liberal" colleagues in the German Foreign Office and the armed forces. It was not that in principle they would have resisted the re-establishment of the Reich as the supreme power on the Continent or would have been against a strong position for the Reich as a colonial power. It was merely that their fears in the face of the war course Hitler was strictly pursuing led them to regard the risk involved in achieving these aims as too high. Beck, the Chief of the General Staff, resigned in opposition to Hitler's policy 58 . His successor, Halder, made contact with the conspiratorial group round Canaris and von Witzleben who, although they never made any concrete plans 59 , played with the idea of replacing Hitler in the event of a serious international set-back or the outbreak of war, in order to protect Germany from a military catastrophe 60 . But the mediator the sent to London to seek support from Britain, the vital power in the matter, had hardly any success 61 . For at least Neville Chamberlain, the key man, had no intention of jeopardising his concept of agreement reached in stages with Hitler by getting involved with conspirators who were working against the established government in Germany. To the British Premier, the envoys of the conservatives in Germany seemed like the Jacobites at the French Court. He preferred to deal with those in office in Berlin and perhaps even hoped that he would be able to achieve his plan of a comprehensive settlement more smoothly with the "Austrian" Hitler than with the conservative "Prussian" conspirators 62 . Chamberlain could hardly imagine why Hitler should want to reject his idea of a settlement, which even in the concrete case of the Czech crisis permitted the annexation of the Sudetenland to the Reich. But Hitler had no intention of tying himself down to the rules of reasonable and peaceful procedure. Rather, under a certain time-pressure, not least of all for personal reasons 63 , Hitler was obviously planning to settle all the "preliminaries" - including even the French campaign - by 1943-45. This would then enable him to dedicate himself to the "important matter" in the East, smashing Soviet Russia and finally, in the second half of the 1940s, moving beyond the continent of Europe to pursue his policy on a world-wide scale.
While in the Reich the navy and the officials responsible for colonial and maritime planning were casting a shadow over Hitler's future aims, in London Sir Horace Wilson, the confidential aide to the British Prime Minister, was negotiating with Wohlthat, the Secretary of State from Goering's staff responsible for the Four Year Plans 64 . The British negotiator, completely in line with the policy of Chamberlain, made the Germans the offer of allowing Germany the exercise of influence in colonial policy and the shaping of economic relations in south-east Europe. Of course, in these discussions, Wohlthat did not follow Hitler's program of military conquests. With his policy of economic expansionism Wohlthat was much more a follower of Schacht, who had been deprived of his powers. In this, he was arguing completely in line with Goering who had already condemned Hitler's war course and was now trying to divert the Fuehrer from the road of military expansion by brining about an economic and political "alternative" solution. Goering sought to direct the Fuehrer along the path of a peaceful "liberal-imperialistic" policy by creating a strong position for the Reich in Europe and overseas 65 .
In connection with this, perhaps note should be taken of the plans of the opposition which was establishing itself against Hitler in 1938-39. The plans were to depose Hitler and place the no doubt more peacefully-inclined Goering at the head of the state. Even if Goering never actually stood in opposition to his Fuehrer, one may still regard his peaceful "liberal-imperialistic" conception of economic expansion and political influence, consciously or unconsciously developed by Goering, as an "alternative" to Hitler's Program 66 . In his speech at the Nuremberg part rally on 9 September 1938, however 67 , Hitler forced the Sudetenland crisis to a head, causing the British Prime Minister to hurry over to Germany in order to save the peace. That is, in line with the familiar policy of appeasement, Chamberlain permitted Hitler this concession too, in a reasonable, non-military way. The British Premier recognised the right to self-determination of the Sudeten Germans and promised Hitler that together with France they would urge Prague to agree to cession without a plebiscite. On the other hand, the Czech President, Benes, wanted war against the Reich in September 1938 as he believed that Germany would be conquered in three to four weeks 69 .
Chamberlain's attitude can only be understood properly if it is seen in the context of his basic plan for peace. His aim was to allow the status quo to alter just enough for it to be protected and maintained in its broad outlines. In this way, with insufficient political, military and economic means, he hoped to be able to maintain and stabilise Britain's position as a world power. As the first stage in Britain's concessions to the Reich, the settlement of the Czech question was complicated only by the fact that, quite beyond Chamberlain's understanding, Hitler seemed to want to proceed on an aggressive, military footing. A week later the British Prime Minister returned once more to Germany with his Cabinet's approval of the agreement arrived at with the Fuehrer on 15 September 1938. But Hitler, governed by his principle of conquering Europe by quick military attacks, not by long and wearisome negotiations, felt himself to be under pressure of time. He informed an embittered Chamberlain that he demanded the immediate intervention of German troops in the Sudetenland; an ultimatum to that effect was to expire on 28 September 1938. And yet even this blow did not alter the basic situation for Chamberlain. He had no intention of jeopardising his major peace plan for the sake of a couple of thousand square miles of land belonging to a second-rate nation in Central Europe. So the British government conceded and called the Italian Duce in on the discussions, who in turn called a conference of the "inner circle" of powers at Munich 69 . Posing as the European mediator, Mussolini presented a proposal which, among over things, provided for the intervention of German troops in stages between 1 October and 10 October 1938 and which was based on settling the question of the remaining minorities in Czechoslovakia. Significantly enough, this compromise, so favourable to Germany yet only reluctantly accepted by Hitler, was a plan which had been drafted by the German Foreign Office and on which both von Weizsaecker and Hermann Goering had been working. Even though this agreement brought the Reich considerable success, it was nevertheless in evident contrast to Hitler's policy, since in principle it proposed settling the crisis in a peaceful manner.
Three conclusions may thus be drawn which are of decisive importance for the course of events over the months up to the outbreak of war, in fact up to the beginning of the war on a world scale on 22 June 1941:
1. The events surrounding the Czech crisis had clearly revealed Hitler's desire for war. The Fuehrer intended getting the first, the European, stage of his plans behind him by means of lighting military attacks in the shadow of British neutrality. At the same time he was preparing the tools by which, through threats, he thought Britain could be held in check, and which afterwards, in the latter half of the 1940s, were to serve as a means for Germany to expand overseas.
2. The non-participation of the Soviet Union at the Munich Conference clearly demonstrated that the Western powers were not inclined to accept the USSR as a partner in international politics. This induced Stalin to alter his tactics in foreign policy 70 . Afraid that the capitalist democracies and fascist dictatorships could unite against Russia and defeat it, Stalin's Foreign Commissar Litvinov, using the slogan of "collective security" and Russia's entry into the League of Nations, had sought to make an alliance with the anti-revisionist capitalist nations. At the latest by the Munich Agreement, this policy must be seen as having failed.' 71 While Stalin's aim remained unchanged - to exacerbate the tensions between the "imperialist" powers as far as possible in order to ensure the continued existence of Soviet Russia - the pro-Western "Litvinov era" now drew to its close with the "encirclement" of the USSR at the Munich Conference. When Molotov moved into the Foreign Office on 3 May 1939, a new chapter in Soviet foreign policy was initiated. Now the old aim of maintaining the security and protecting the interests of Soviet Russia was to be achieved with new partners. Thus the foundations of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939 were laid in Munich.
3. The Munich Conference and the policy of Neville Chamberlain, which led to it - often misunderstood and vilified as a humiliating series of ignominious retreats - had shown how stubbornly the British Prime Minister was pursuing his aim of securing peace. As he saw it, no war should break out over European concessions, which he was in fact prepared to make to Hitler. In the course of his crisis diplomacy, Chamberlain was far more concerned that after settling European matters, he would succeed in achieving proper talks on an arms agreement by means of the economic and colonial bait. He wanted to press for a settlement in order to ensure peace and so save Britain's position as a world power in Europe and overseas.
References:
46.On the role of the so-called minorities in pre-revolutionary Europe cf. K. Hildebrand, Die Suche nach dem "wahren" Preussen', in: PVS 1970.
47.Cf. J. K. Hoensch, Geschichte der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918ΓÇô1965 , Stuttgart, 1966, and J. W. Bruegel, Tschechen und Deutsche 1918 bis 1938 , Munich, 1967.
48.Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik , p. 442.
49.Ibid., p. 443.
50. Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes Bonn , Vol. II, England-Deutschland VII: Aufzeichnung von Bismarck , 10.5.1938.
51.See also M. Mackintosh, Juggernaut: A History of the Soviet Armed Forces , New York, 1967.
52.See A. Hillgruber , Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege , Goettingen, 1967, p. 78 f.
53.W. Foerster , Generalstabsche Ludwig Beck , Munich, 1953, p. 107 f.
54.See Mueller, Heer und Hitler , pp. 345 ff.
55.54a The book by J. Henke, Hitler und England 1937ΓÇô1939, loc. cit., throws light on these possibilities, which could have implied a military ousting of Britain from the Continent.
56.See Salewski, Seekriegsleitung , loc. cit. and J. Duelffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine , loc. cit. In this connection cf. particularly the memorandum Aufbau der Kriegsmarine 1926ΓÇô1939' by government adviser Dr Treue, in: Bundesarchiv/Militaerarchiv Freiburg : Pg.ΓÇô33965 and also idem, Nachlass Beck HO 8ΓÇô28: Nuernberger Documents Ps 3037 (Wiedemann). The author would wish to thank Dr M. Michaelis (London) for having kindly drawn his attention to these two documents.
57.See p. 50.
58.Cf. Salewski, Seekriegsleitung , loc. cit.; Duelffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine , loc. cit. and C.-A. Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. Der Kampf fuer einen maritimen Operationsplan , Lund, 1965, p. 94 f.
59.On the character of Beck cf. Foerster, Beck , loc cit.
60.Mueller, Hitler und Heer , pp. 345 ff.
61.See p. 57.
62.On the mission of Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, for example, see the biography by B. Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler , Oldenburg-Hamburg, 1968.
63.On this thesis cf. B.-J. Wendt, Munich, 1938; England zwischen Hitler und Preussen , Frankfurt/M., 1965.
64.Cf. the corresponding remarks in the Hossbach Memorandum', loc. cit.
65. ADAP , D. II, No. 279, pp. 363 ff.
66.See also p. 57.
67.Ibid.
68. VB of 13 September 1938.
69.Cf. Bensch's talk with Stampfer on 19 October 1939, in: W. Link (compiler), Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland , Duesseldorf, 1968, Doc. 77.
70.From among the mass of literature on the Munich Conference cf. the works by B. Celovsky, Das Muenchener Abkommen 1938 , Stuttgart, 1958; H. K. G. Roennefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik. EntstehungΓÇôVerlaufΓÇôAuswirkung , Wiesbaden, 1961; K. Eubank, Munich , Oklahoma, 1963; B.-J. Wendt, Muenchen, 1938, loc. cit.; D. N. Lammers, Explaining Munich. The Search for Motive in British Policy , Stanford, 1966, andΓÇôas a supplement and correctiveΓÇôK. Robbins, Munich 1938 , Guetersloh, 1969.
